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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OE UTAH
F . W I L L I A M McGINN I I ,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

\
/
i

v.

1. C use So.

U T A H P O W E E tV L I C T I T
C O M P A N Y -. Main.. .•<>r|>or:it,..n.
Drfciithni!-Appellant.

j
)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

P R E I J M I N , \ II Y S T A T E M E N T
After appellant filed its initial brief, the Supreme
Court of Colorado in Simpson v. Anderson, 526 P.2d
298 (Colo. 1974) held that informing the jury of the
effect of its answers to the interrogatories was contrary
t<> the int"irl khiiid th" comparative negligence statute Thus Th" Supreme Court reversed thr Colorado
intermediate court decision which the l:ial judge in the
instant case relied upon in granting ^l.iiiiliff's motion
for a new trial.
1
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The undisputed facts, as stated in appellant's and
respondent's brief, show that the plaintiff was injured
when he and four of his companions were carrying a
sailboat with a 26 foot aluminum mast toward the north
shore of Bear Lake when the mast struck defendant's
power line.
Issues raised in plaintiff's brief and cross-appeal
are answered below.

POINT I
S I N C E T H I S CASE W A S T R I E D U N D E R
THE
IDAHO
COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE STATUTE, T H A T STATUTE ALSO
CONTROLS T H E M A N N E R IN W H I C H T H E
C A S E I S S U B M I T T E D TO T H E J U R Y .
From the outset of the trial there was agreement
that this case would be tried under the Idaho Comparative Negligence Law. An important part of that statute
is §6-802, which states:
"6-802. Verdict giving percentage of negligence attributable to each party.—The court
may, and when requested by any party shall,
direct the jury to find separate special verdicts
determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party;
and the court shall then reduce the amount of
such damage in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering."
[1971, ch. 186, §2, p. 862.]
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Further, it is evident from the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in Holland v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728,
518 P.2d 1190 (1974) that it is improper for the attorneys or the court to inform the jury as to what effect
its answers to the special verdict will have on the final
outcome of the case. Now respondent is arguing that
this part of the Idaho Comparative Negligence Law
should not have been applied in the trial. H e claims
whether or not to inform the jury is merely a procedural
matter, and under the accepted conflict of laws rule,
the procedural rules of the forum state (Utah) should
be applied.
However, respondent oversimplifies what is procedural and what is substantive. In essence, he would
allow the court to try this case under the Idaho Comparative Negligence Statute, but would refuse to permit
the court to use the underlying policy which makes this
law operate in the effective manner intended by the
Idaho legislature. This policy goes to the heart of the
Idaho Comparative Negligence Statute, and for the
Utah court to apply the Idaho law without also applying
the clearly enunciated Idaho rule on comment to the
jury would be to emasculate the Idaho law and subvert
the very purpose of the statute—that being to convert
the jury into an exclusive fact-finding body removed
from the sway of passion or prejudice. Obviously this
policy is part of the substantive Idaho law.
There are no hard and fast rules governing what
is substantive and what is procedural. Professor Mor3
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gan, in his aiticle entitled "Choice of Law Governing
Proof" (58 Harv. L. Rev., p. 153, 1944) states:
". . . The time has passed when the decision of
important questions should turn on mere classification or upon the willingness or unwillingness
of judges to pour enlarged meaning into old definitions. It is time to abandon both the notion
and the expression that matters of procedure are
governed by the law of the forum. It should be
frankly stated that (1) the law of the locus is to
be applied in all matters of substinance except
where its application will violate the public policy
of the forum; and (2) the law of the locus is to
be applied in all such matters of procedure as
are likely to have a material influence upon the
outcome of the litigation except where (a) its
application will violate the public policy of the
forum or (b) weighty practical considerations
demand the application of the law of the forum."
Id. at 195.
The law regarding permissible comment and instruction to the jury is likely to have a material influence upon the outcome of this litigation. Further, since
the policy that it is improper to inform the jury of the
effect of its answers to the special verdict is part of the
law of every jurisdiction which has a comparative negligence statute similar to Utah's, there is no reason why
applying this Idaho rule would violate Utah's public
policy. Therefore, Idaho's policy that it is improper to
inform the jury of the effect of its answers to the special
verdict should be considered as an essential part of the
Idaho Comparative Negligence substantive law and
should be applied in this case.

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There can be no doubt that a comparative negligence statute along with its underlying policies is not
merely procedural but affects the substantive rights of
the parties. In Chism v. Phelps, 311 S.W.2d 297 (Ark.,
1958) the court, in considering this issue stated:
"While no simple formula can be evolved to determimne the difference between the two (comparative negligence and contributory negligence), we think the right of a party plaintiff
to recover substantial damages even though he
is 10% or even 49% negligent involves a substantive right and is not a matter of procedure."
Id. at 300.
If the forum state chooses to apply the comparative law of a foreign jurisdiction, as Utah has done in
this instance, must the Utah court merely adopt the
whole of the foreign state's law or can the court merely
accept the basic framework of submitting special interrogatories to the jury for its percentage findings, but
reject the underlying principals and policies essential
to the operation of this law? To allow a court to do
this would be to subvert the entire rationale for applying the foreign law. Such reasoning was followed in
Fitzpatrick v. International By. Co., 169 N.E. 112
(N.Y., 1929) when a New York court held:
" . . . As we have said, the Ontario (Comparative Negligence) Act goes beyond a matter of
procedure and gives a right unknown to the common law, the right of an injured person to recover for another's negligence, even though contributing by his own neglect to bring it about.

5
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For these reasons the trial court was quite correct
in charging the jury in accordance with the
Ontario statute.
The appellant suggests that, as this act does not
refer to the burden of proof, the plaintiff, under
our form of procedure, should have the burden
of proving either freedom from contributing
negligence or else the degree to which his own
negligence contributed. W e have no such law
in this state. To follow the appellant's suggestion would still require our courts to adopt a portion of the Ontario statute. If we adopt a part
we must apply it as a whole, because it affects
the substantial rights of the parties" (emphasis
added) Id. at 115.
Appellant respectfully submits the Idaho policy
of not permitting a jury in a negligence case to be
informed of the effect of its answers is clearly an
integral part of the substantive law of that jurisdiction.
The Utah court, when it applied the Idaho Comparative Negligence statute in this case, was correct in its
initial ruling that the whole of the Idaho law, including
this essential policy, should govern the trial.

POINT II
UNDER T H E U T A H COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE LAW, T H E J U R Y SHOULD
NOT BE ADVISED OF T H E E F F E C T ITS
P E R C E N T A G E F I N D I N G S H A V E ON T H E
O U T C O M E O F T H E CASE.
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Even if this court should rule that this essential
Idaho policy is procedural and not substantive, and thus
apply Utah procedure, it should have no effect on the
final outcome of this appeal. Utah law on this point
should follow every other comparative negligence jurisdiction, and it is respectfully submitted that this court
should adopt the rule permitting no comment to the
jury regarding the effect of its answers to the special
verdict.
Appellant agrees that this is a matter of first impression under Utah's new comparative negligence law.
It was shown in appellant's brief that every other comparative negligence jurisdiction including Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Arkansas, Tennessee, Colorado and Idaho
have found after experience with this system that comparative negligence works best and most efficiently if
the jury is not informed of the effect of its percentage
findings. Respondent argues that even though Utah's
comparative negligence law was patterned after the
Wisconsin and Idaho statute, Utah should not adopt the
Wisconsin and Idaho rule regarding comment on the
percentages. The only case respondent could cite which
substantiated his position was a decision by an intermediate Colorado court, Simpson v. Anderson, 517 P.2d
416 (1974) which held that the jury should be advised
of the effect its findings had upon the verdict. However,
on September 9, 1974, the Supreme Court of Colorado
reversed this case holding:
"During closing argument, counsel for the
respondent-defendant informed the jury that the
7
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plaintiff would be entitled to recover only if the
jury found the plaintiff less negligent than the
defendant. Such comment or explanation to the
jury is contrary to the intent behind our comparative negligence statute: (1971 Perm. Supp.,
C.R.S. 1963, 41-2-14). We hold that comment,
explanation, or instruction to the jury on the
effect of its answers in the special verdict form in
negligence cases is clearly improper under our
comparative negligence statute. W e therefore
find that reversible error exists and that this
cause must be remanded for a new trial." (emphasis added). Simpson v. Anderson, 526 P.2d
298 (1974).
See also Avery v. Wadlington, 526 P.2d 295
(Colo. 1974), a companion case to Simpson in which the
Colorado Supreme Court more fully sets out its reasons for adopting the "no comment rule."
With Simpson reversed, respondent cannot point
to even one comparative negligence jurisdiction which
has adopted the rule which he is now urging the Utah
courts to adopt. The reason these other states, including our sister states of Idaho and Colorado, have all
adopted the no comment policy is that they recognize such a policy is essential if the underlying concept
of the jury operating solely as a fact-finding body is to
be achieved.
Under the Utah comparative negligence statute,
the division of responsibility between the court and jury
is evident. The jury is the finder of fact and simply
answers special questions based on what it determines
the facts to be. By stature, the court applies the law

8
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and brings about the result by appropriate judicial
order. Under this system, it is not the jury's function
to attempt to understand the comparative negligence
law nor to attempt to have the effect of this law
reflected in its answers to the special verdict. Jury involvement is therefore greatly simplified, even in very
complex multiple party, multiple claim, multiple issue
cases.
Where a jury is tolcl only what it needs to know
under proper instructions integrated with the special
verdict form, a jury's thought processes and function
are channeled along specified lines. Since it is not
necessary for the jury to concern itself with how much
the plaintiff receives, the policy makes it more likely
that a "pure verdict" unaffected by passion, prejudice
or misunderstanding will be obtained. A jury will simply carry out its function and while in some instances
it may wonder or perhaps even know the effect of particular findings, it will not concern itself with that aspect of the case because it is clearly not part of the
jury's sworn duty.
On the other hand, if the jury is given unnecessary
information as to the effect of its special findings, and
emphasis is placed upon the particular percentage findings necessary to bring about a particular result, the
jury may very well believe that it is a jury function
to cause a certain end result and thus may adjust its
percentage allocations and monetary award accordingly.
Take for example the trial of the present case,

9
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where the jury found the plaintiff's negligence to be
60%. The jury answered the special interrogatory to
that effect because that was its described function, and
neither the attorneys nor the judge suggested that the
jury should be aware of the end result. The jury may
have felt sorry for the injured plaintiff and wanted
him to receive something, but the instructions, special
verdict and conduct of the trial clearly defined its function, and the jury did not go beyond it. If the jury is
informed of the effect of its answers and mistakenly
tries to perform the court's function, it will inevitably
fail to carry out its function under the comparative
negligence law. Telling the jury invites confusion,
injects unnecessary collateral information and encourages the jury to succumb to the effects of passion and
prejudice, thus abandoning its role as a strict finder
of fact.
The facts in McGinn are relatively simple and
involve only two parties. Many cases, however, can
become quite complex with multiple issues, multiple
parties, crossclaims and counterclaims. If a jury is simply directed to answer specific questions with the court
then to apply the law, even complicated cases can be
tried with relative ease. But, if the jury is told about
the effect its answers will have on each issue and party,
the case will be impossible to control and the jury will
certainly end up confused. In fact, it would probably
be impossible in a multi-issue, multi-party case for the
court to draft instructions explaining the mechanics of
the comparative negligence law in a manner which is
10
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comprehensible to layman jurors- A policy of the jury
operating as fact-finders is far superior to respondent's
suggested policy which, in complicated cases, would
result in chaos.
The special verdict concept of channeling jury
thought and function along specified lines is nothing
new in Utah. It is seen daily in other areas of the
law. Jurors in criminal cases are not told about what
sentence an accused could receive if convicted and the
jury does not fix the penalty. The reason is that the
jury function is only to determine guilt or innocence,
not to determine the legal result of that finding. The
jury is not told whether there is insurance in a case
and what the limits of coverage are. The jury is not
informed whether or not the plaintiff has been paid in
full or in part by his own insurance. Further, the jury
is not told whether the accident is covered by workman's
compensation so that a portion of plaintiff's recovery,
if any, will be paid to the compensation carrier. It is
deemed improper to tell the jury that attorneys' fees
will come from the award; that the plaintiff will receive
interest from the date of judgment; and that plaintiff
will not be required to pay income tax on the judgment.
The reason the jury is not told is that the jury does
not need to know and its findings should not be influenced and perhaps prejudiced by unnecessary collateral issues.
Plaintiff argues that such a policy of no comment
demonstrates a distrust of the jury system. This is sim11
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ply not the case. The issue is not one of "distrust" at all.
The problem is that the jury does not need to know
and is particularly ill-suited to attempt to understand
and apply the comparative negligence statute. I t is
not a matter of distrust, but rather a recognition that
jurors often allow sympathy to cause them to violate
their oath to return a verdict based on fact. A concise
statement of the reason for the rule of no comment
is contained in Wright v. Convey, 349 S.W.2d 344
(Ark. 1961):
The reason for the rule is that the special interrogatories are intended to elicit the jury's unbiased judgment upon the issues of fact, and this
purpose might be frustrated if the jurors are in
a position to frame their answers with a conscious
desire to aid one side or the other, (emphasis
added).
One of the foundation stones of comparative negligence is its policy of a fact-finding jury which returns
a "pure verdict" by way of the special verdict procedure. Emasculation of this main feature of the law
and the procedural nightmare that will result should
not be permitted. Utah should follow the precedent of
every other comparative negligence state by not informing the jury of the effect its answers will have on the
final outcome of the case.
POINT III
T H E I N S T R U C T I O N TO T H E J U R Y
E X P L A I N I N G T H E LACK OF RELATION12
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S H I P B E T W E E N T H E PERCENTAGES OF
R E L A T I V E F A U L T AND DAMAGES WAS
PROPER.
A. The Special Verdict Clearly Set Out The
Fact That The Jury Should Ignore The Percentage
Of Relative Fault Interrogatory When Answering
The Damage Interrogatory.
Under comparative negligence, the jury determines the percentage of fault and also finds the total
damages. If the jury holds by its percentage finding
that the defendant is at least 51% at fault, the court
performs the necessary mathematics to determine the
dollar amount of the verdict. A comparative negligence
jury should be made aware that it should answer the
damage interrogatory without considering its answers
to the preceeding fault interrogatories. This requirement was clearly met by the instruction given in the
McGinn damage interrogatory which read:
"Question No. 4. Disregarding any of the previous answers, what is the total amount of
damages sustained by plaintiff F . William
McGinn I I as a result of the incident?" (emphasis added).
In plain and concise English this instruction told the
jury to disregard its answers to the previous fault interrogatories and find the total amount of plaintiff's damages. There is no evidence on the record that the jury
was confused in this regard. Its finding of $150,000.00
general damages and $18,150.00 special damages was
13
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what they believed plaintiff's total damages to be. This
instruction was proper and sufficient, and not misconstrued by the jury. It must be presumed that the jury
followed the clear instructions given to it by the court,
and disregarded its previous answers to the fault interrogatory. Any instruction which went into too much
detail on this point would have tended to overemphasize the percentage figures, thus causing the jury to
improperly guess at their meaning and to stray from
its fact-finding role.
B. Respondent Has Waived His Right To Object To The Interrogatory On Damages.
Both parties submitted requested instructions and
a special verdict form to the court. Respondent's requested special verdict (R 188) was couched in language which tended to inform the jury of the effect
its answers had on the final outcome of the case and
was refused by the judge. After a discussion concerning what form the damage interrogatory should take,
the court decided upon the language quoted in subsection A. After the instructions and special verdict
were read and the jury retired to deliberate, respondent
made various objections and exceptions to specific instructions (R 886-887). Respondent did not object or
except to the giving of the damage interrogatory, nor
did he request the instruction he now argues should
have been given. Respondent admitted this during the
argument on the motion for a new trial. On page R 930931 of the record, counsel for respondent stated:
14
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" . . . and admittedly I didn't make this request
at trial but I think you have the discretion to
consider it now.
Although I did not request this instruction at the time of trial, I feel it is excusable
neglect in view of the fact that it is the first
trial any of us have tried . . . "
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs this point. It states in pertinent part:
. . . If the instructions are to be given in
writing, all objections thereto must be made
before the instructions are given to the jury;
otherwise, objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but before
the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party
may assign as error the giving or the failure to
give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In
objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party
must state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his objection."
Another sentence of Rule 51 says:
"Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement,
the appellate court, in its discretion and in the
interests of justice, may review the giving or
the failure to give an instruction."
This language gives the court discretion under certain circumstances to review the giving or refusal to
give a requested instruction. This language is not applicable in the case at bar since here we are dealing
with an instruction which was not requested or presented to the court and which is not contained in this
record on appeal. Counsel's argumemnt on this point
15
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is not based on the record and should be disregarded
in the interests of justice.
Utah courts have consistently refused to permit an
appeal based upon instructions which were not objected
to at the time of trial. In Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah
2d 63, 475 P.2d 839 (1970), where plaintiff appealed
based upon the giving of an erroneous instruction, the
court stated:
"Such error, at best a highly debatable one,
was not urged at the trial but for the first time
on appeal. Our rules say, and repeatedly we
have said that such exception must be asserted
and made a matter of record at the trial level,
failing which it is not reviewable on appeal
except where unusual and compelling circumstances exist calling for correction by the existence of sound discretion. Such circumstances
are not apparent here." 475 P.2d at 840.
Respondent should have objected or excepted to
the giving of the damage interrogatory at trial. Even
though afforded ample opportunity, respondent made
no such objection. It was only after the adverse jury
verdict that the respondent manifested any objection
to an interrogatory with which he had seemed perfectly
happy. Therefore, under the law respondent should be
precluded from objecting to the damage interrogatory
in this appeal since he took no steps to timely preserve
the question at the time of trial. Further, respondent
cannot appeal based upon an instruction which he neither requested or presented to the court until after
the jury verdict.

16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C. Since The Jury's Answer To The Percentage
Of Fault Interrogatories Made The Damage Interrogatory Irrevalent, Said Damage Interrogatory, Even
If Incorrect, Constituted Harmless Error.
The jury considered the percentage of fault interrogatory and found the plaintiff more negligent than
the defendant. Under the Idaho comparative negligence law such a finding dictated a judgment of no
cause of action regardless of what the jury found the
damages to be. Thus, once the jury determined that
the plaintiff was 60% negligent, any finding on damages was irrelevant.
Of course, appellant takes the position that the
language of the damage interrogatory was clear, concise and proper. But even if the damage interrogatory
were to be held improper, the giving of that instruction was harmless error due to the jury's answers to
the previous fault interrogatory. To argue otherwise
respondent would have to convince the court that somehow the jury's determination of the damages affected
its percentage findings. However, it is clear from the
record that the jury answered the percentage of relative fault interrogatory based upon the facts elicited
at trial. The jury's finding that the greater fault lay
with the plaintiff negated any importance of the damage interrogatory. Thus, the utmost an improper damage instruction could constitute in this case would be
harmless error, and it is well established Utah law that
a jury verdict will not be overturned on the basis of
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harmless error. See Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; Joseph v. W. H. Groves
Latter-Day
Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960) ;
and Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 87, 348 P.2d 931
(1960).

P O I N T IV
T H E T R I A L COURT P R O P E R L Y REF U S E D TO A D M I T C E R T A I N
PHOTOGRAPHS.
A few days after the accident, defendant's employees assigned to the area nailed warning signs on
two poles on the 46 KV line bordering the accident
area (Exhibits 66p, 67p and 68p). The signs nailed
to the poles were identical to Exhibit 58p.
The photographs of the signs on the poles were
offered in evidence during the testimony of a Utah
Power & Light employee, Mr. Daniel James Raymond, District Representative of the Montpelier, Idaho
District which includes the Camp Lifton area.
Plaintiff asked the court for a cautionary instruction that the photographs were not to be considered as
evidence of negligence but were offered to show: the
practicality and ease with which the signs could have
been put up; to impeach the testimony of Mr. Raymond ; and on the issue of whether or not the plaintiff
was a trespasser at the time of the accident (R 797-798).
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Mr. Raymond stated on direct examination he was
familiar with the signs (R 794), that there was a supply of the signs in the Montpelier Office (R 794) and
that they were sent out with the information that they
should be put around irrigation systems (R796). When
Mr. Raymond was asked if it would have been practical and feasible to place the signs in recreational areas
he answered yes.
Q (By Mr. Roberts) Is there any reason why
that couldn't protect someone with any kind of
a long pole?
A

(Mr. Raymond)

Any reason it couldn't?

Q Yes.
A I don't see why it couldn't, if they would read
it, yes.
Q And it would have been practical and feasible
to take this very sign and place it on various
poles around in the state park west of Lifton,
would it not?
A I think there would be any observing of pipes
being raised or anything of this sort it may have
been.
Q It would have been practical and feasible is
my question. Is the answer to that yes?
A It is, yes. (R797)
After a recess was taken so the court could hear
arguments on the admissibility of Exhibits 66p, 67p
and 68p, Mr. Raymond was called back to the stand and
asked:
Q (By Mr. Roberts) Just a few more matters,
Mr. Raymond. One thing, where we left off,
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would you agree with me, sir, that as of July
1972 before this accident happened there was no
particular reason why this sign could not have
been used in a recreational area had you seen
fit to do so?
A (Mr. Raymond) I think that is what I said
just before the recess. (R 708)
The photographs were not admissible to impeach
Mr. Raymond's testimony because he admitted it would
have been practical and feasible to put the signs in the
area where the accident happened (R 797, 708 p 486).
By claiming the photographs should have been
allowed in evidence to show that it would have been
practical and feasible to put the signs up, plaintiff obviously was offering the Exhibits to show negligence. The
admission of the Exhibits would have clearly violated
Rule 51, Rules of Evidence, which states:
Subsequent Remedial Conduct. When after the
occurrence of an event remedial or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously would have tended to make the event less
likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence
or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
(emphasis added).
N O T E : This rule relates only to negligence
and not to causation. It is not intended to exclude evidence which might be admissible on
other grounds, independent of such provisions.
The ruling of the court in refusing to admit the
photographs was in accord with the Rules of Evidence
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and also in accord with the earlier Utah case of Potter
v. Dr. TV. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 99
Utah 71, 103 P.2d 280 (1940) where this court held:
" . . . Evidence of alterations or repairs to premises under his control made following an accident therein is inadmissible to show as against a
defendant that the former condition was unsafe
or was being negligently maintained, (emphasis added).
This rule is recognized in practically all jurisdictions. See annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Repairs, Change of Conditions or Precautions Taken
After Accident, 64 ALR2d 1298.
Since the accident happened on Utah Power &
Light property, defendant claimed one of the issues was
whether or not the plaintiff was a trespasser and if so,
what duty was owing to him.
The plaintiff's main reason for offering the photographs of signs posted after the accident was to show
that the plaintiff was not a trespasser. *i
The court ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff was not a trespasser at the time and place of the
accident and that the photographs of the signs posted
after the accident were not admissible (R 815).
*i See argument of plaintiffs counsel (R 801):
MR. ROBERTS: Those pictures are before your honor for
admission, that you haven't ruled on them yet.
THE COURT: I see. Then what you intend to do would be
to argue to the jury, these are taken, well, sometime after
the accident. Would that be your purpose; wouldn't it?
MR. ROBERTS: To show that there is no trespass. . . .
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(The Court) "The court also finds that this
plaintiff was not a trespasser at the time and
place in question of this accident.
And the court also will not permit any further Exhibits or evidence or anything of that
nature in connection with the remedial steps
taken." (R 815).
This ruling obviated the plaintiff's request to admit
the photographs.
The trial court should be granted discretion in ruling on the admissibility of this type of evidence.
H e should consider the policy of the law; to encourage precautionary measures taken after accidents
to prevent further injury. H e must weigh this policy
against the reason for which the evidence is offered.
In this case none of the reasons for which the photographs were offered were valid.
Mr. Raymond's admission that the signs were available and could have been posted; the statement of plaintiff's counsel that the Exhibits were not offered to show
negligence; and the court's ruling that the plaintiff was
not a trespasser as a matter of law eliminated the relevancy of the proposed Exhibits,
It is respectfully submitted that the trial judge did
not commit prejudicial error in refusing to admit these
photographs into evidence.
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POINT V
T H E T R I A L COURT DID NOT UNREAS O N A B L Y R E S T R I C T P L A I N T I F F S COUNSEL IN CLOSING ARGUMENT.
After the court ruled that the jury would not be
advised of the effect of the comparative negligence, the
question arose as to how far counsel could go in arguing the negligence of each party.
The following colloquy occurred between the court
and counsel:
MR. R O B E R T S : In reference to this matter
of telling the jury why we cannot under your
ruling comment on the effect of it, of the percentage findings, would there be any prohibition against urging them to find the defendant
more responsible than the plaintiff, things like
that, without telling them what the percentages
are? Now it seems to me that is certainly fair
comment and fair argument. I urge you to.
T H E C O U R T : Yes. Let's go further. I think
each one of you can urge that your party was
not negligent at all, that the whole contributing
cause of this accident and negligence was the
other party.
MR. R O B E R T S : Or if he was negligent, we
think it was relatively slight with that of the
power company, or something like that. I think
that is certainly fair game.
T H E C O U R T : You would agree to that?
MR. N E B E K E R : I would agree with the
court's statement that counsel could argue that
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he thinks his client was not negligent and the
other party was, or vice versa. The danger with
getting into this slight or greater than may be
a little hazardous. I am not sure about that. But
I think it depends on how it is stated and what
inference is given to it as to whether or not there
is an effect. I think you have to be very careful
in explaining that to the jury.
T H E C O U R T : I think each party can argue
within legal bounds that their own client was
either not negligent at all or very, very slight
and that the other party was grossly negligent
or almost the only negligence, but no mention
of the fact that the money award depends on
the degree. See what I mean? Even like a
ten-ninety or anything else. Stay away from anything like that, and especially don't even get
near that fifty-fifty thing.
MR. R O B E R T S : Yes.
MR. N E B E K E R : I think that is proper. (R
816-817)

This subject was again discussed by the court and
counsel just before the matter was submitted to the jury.
MR. N E B E K E R : My request is that going to
the judge's ruling that we not argue the effect
of the comparative negligence, I think that is
what the court has ruled, and I think maybe we
should have that ground rule understood.
T H E C O U R T : I think it should be understood
that in making your arguments with respect to
liability that of course neither side will mention
the effect of the percentage application or allocation of negligence that they are going to be
asked in the verdict. If you mention blame and
negligence I think it should be done in the con-
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text of in every case urging the jury that your
client is entirely free from negligence, and that
the cause of this action was caused by the negligence of the other party.
MR. R O B E R T S : I think we should argue that
comparatively speaking the negligence of the
power company is substantially more than the
negligence of our client, if any, we believe.
T H E C O U R T : That part is all right. But
don't mention the word percentage or refer to
that particular question they have to answer in
connection with your argument at all, because
I will instruct them on that. Do you see what
I mean?
MR. R O B E R T S : W e have to have some way
to get to it. Can't we say they will be asked to
answer certain questions and without trying to
attribute the responsibility to the two parties, and
we would urge that as between the two our
client is not responsible at all, or if so, very little, and the power company is very responsible,
and we've got to be able to argue that.
T H E C O U R T : I think you can go that far.
MR. R O B E R T S : I want the record at the
same time to show our exception to this, and we
think the jury ought to know what they are doing, and I am sure we have already made our
record on that. (Mr. Roberts was excepting to
the ruling by the court that the jury would not
be informed of the effect of their answers to the
special interrogatories). (R 825-826)
The court, in stating that counsel should stay
away from that "fifty-fifty thing" was directing that admonition to defendant's counsel, not plaintiff's counsel.
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Inasmuch as this 50-50 argument has been effectively utilized by defense counsel, the court properly
advised counsel for both sides to avoid such argument.
The court gave counsel for both parties the right
to argue the relative negligence of each party. Certainly
there was no prejudice to the plaintiff by this "ground
rule." I t prevented the 50-50 argument which was
what the court was trying to avoid.
Since both counsel observed the "ground rules"
stated by the court, there was no prejudice to the
plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
This Interlocutory Appeal presents an important
issue regarding comparative negligence law: whether
the jury should be informed of the effect its answers
have on the final outcome of the case. Appellant has
demonstrated that every other comparative negligence
jurisdiction, including our sister states of Idaho and
Colorado, have adopted the "no comment rule." Since
this case was tried under Idaho law, the whole of that
state's comparative negligence law should be recognized
and applied by the Utah court. Furthermore, it is
respectfully submitted that Utah should also adopt the
policy under our new comparative negligence act. Only
through such a rule can the concept of the juries function as a strict fact-finding body be preserved.
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The trial court did not commit prejudicial error by
refusing to admit the photographs of the signs nailed
on poles bordering the accident area a few days after
the accident happened.
The trial court did not unreasonably limit plaintiff's counsel in closing argument.
Therefore, the trial court's order granting a new
trial should be reversed and the jury verdict and judgment of no cause of action should be reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, Q U I N N E Y & N E B E K E R
S T E P H E N B. N E B E K E R
P A U L S. F E L T
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
S I D N E Y G. BAUCOM
M. B L A I N E H O F E L I N G
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